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Deutsche, Ungarn und Slowaken in der Tschechoslowakei zwischen den Weltkriegen |
Andrej Tóth, Lukáš Novotný, Michal Stehlík
ger, aus der Mehrheit wurde eine Minderheit und aus der Minderheit eine 
Mehrheit. Die Grundrahmen der gesellschaftspolitischen Denkweise sind 
aber die gleichen geblieben. Dieser Umstand hat sich auch auf die verfas-
sungsrechtlichen Grundlagen der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik 
niedergeschlagen, die in statu nascendi bereits die Keime der kommenden 
kaum zu überbrückenden Kontroversen auf der innenpolitischen Szene in 
sich trug, die dann langsam aber unaufhaltsam auch infolge der sich erhe-
blich ändernden außenpolitischen Umstände zu einer ernsten Krise des 
tschechoslowakischen Staats heranwuchsen. Eine der Hauptursachen für 
die innenpolitische Krise der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik war 
vor allem die künstlich geschaff ene national-zentralistische Staats- und 
Verwaltungskonzeption, die auf allen Ebenen des soziokulturellen Lebens 
in erster Linie die nationalen Minderheiten benachteiligte. Dieser Konze-
ption haben sich nach und nach nicht nur die wichtigen nationalen Min-
derheiten in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik entgegengestellt, sondern 
auch die andere Hälfte des politisch deklarierten staatsrechtlichen tsche-
choslowakischen Volks, die Slowaken. Wiewohl der Staat schließlich doch 
Anstrengungen gezeigt hat, die Minderheitenpolitik wahrzunehmen, hat 
er gerade die slowakischen Forderungen langfristig unterschätzt. Parallel 
dazu muss natürlich hervorgehoben werden, dass die Erste Republik im 
mitteleuropäischen Raum unbestritten mit Abstand der demokratischste 
Staat war, der seinen Einwohnern breiteste politische und bürgerliche 
Freiheiten gewährte. Gleichzeitig muss auch im Zusammenhang mit den 
oben genannten Umständen betont werden, dass beim Studium von Hal-
tungen der deutschen und ungarischen Minderheitsparteien in der Zwis-
chenkriegs-Tschechoslowakei immer und in erster Linie darauf zu achten 
ist, sämtliche politikgeschichtlichen Aspekte der Ersten Tschechoslowakis-
chen Republik unbedingt und konsequent im Zeitzusammenhang zu be-
trachten.
The Question of Ottoman Weakness at the 
Beginning of the 20th century
In the 19th and 20th century the Ottoman Empire is often described as a “sick 
man of Europe”, which was doomed to break up. The goal of this article is to 
analyze if this statement was justifi ed. With regard to the limited scope this 
contribution will concentrate on three main areas which determine the 
strength of a state – policy, economy and military.
Policy
The investigated period era should be divided into two stages – before and 
after the Young Turk Revolution, which dramatically changed the character 
of the Ottoman state after a long rule of sultan Abdülhamid II.
The rule of this so-called “Bloody Sultan” represents an era of 
a certain tranquility (under Ottoman circumstances at least). “Following 
the eff ective dissolution of the parliamentary order, the sultan began to fa-
shion new methods of administration that resulted in the longest-lasting re-
gime in late Ottoman history.”1 The sultan concentrated all power in his 
hands and the government became only a tool of his own policy. In this way 
the regime, which ruled in Istanbul, was strongly infl uenced by the perso-
nality of the sovereign.
He is often described as a cruel tyrant and had a reputation of 
a classical example of an oriental despot in the English speaking countries. 
However, this picture doesn’t correspond with the complexity of his perso-
nality. It is undoubtedly true that the padishah was strongly infl uenced by 
1)  Şükrü M. HANIOĞLU, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, Princeton 2008, p. 123.
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multaneously proceeded some advances in the reforms of justice and law, 
which were stopped by the sultan in 1888.8 In a similar way, a modernizing 
process in the provinces went on, which was marked especially by the 
building program of the railroads especially thanks to the German invest-
ments. In the year 1888 there were 1,780 kilometers of railways, in 1907 this 
number increased to 5,883 km.9 In short, it could be said, that during the 
reign of Abdülhamid II, the Ottoman state was in some sense strengthened 
internally, especially in those regions, which formed the core of the empire. 
On the contrary the process of disintegration continued in the peripheral 
provinces, where the majority of population was of a non-Muslim origin.
This was not only due to the continuing process of emancipation 
of the Christian nations, but also as a result of the offi  cial policy of the gover-
nment. In an eff ort to strengthen the state internally by some kind of uni-
ting idea the sultan turned to Islamism as a state ideology. The sovereign 
played a role of the Sultan-Caliph in this eff ort, which image was supported 
by the offi  cial state propaganda.10 It happened together with the often brutal 
state policy inspired dissent among the non-Muslim population, which 
showed itself during the Armenian crisis and in the growing chaos in Mace-
donia, where the ethnic situation was especially complicated. The new forms 
of the state ideology had in this sense quite contradictory eff ects – instead of 
uniting the empire caused a deepened the ethnic some religious problems.
On the fi eld of the foreign policy there were a lot of changes during 
the Hamidian Regime. The main diplomatic change was the fact that Britain 
gradually abandoned its long term policy of maintaining the Ottoman Em-
pire as a buff er against Russia. This turn of London’s policy fi nished in the 
second half of the 90’s during the Armenian crisis that persuaded even Salis-
bury that supporting Istanbul is no longer in the British interest.11 This me-
ant a crucial blow to the Ottoman foreign policy. The Porte tried to replace its 
connection with Britain with closer relations with Germany,12 which econo-
8)  LEWIS, p. 184.
9)  SHAW, p. 227.
10)  Although the predicate of Caliph was held by the sultans since 16th century, under Ab-
dülhhamid II, this title gained a new sense and its prestige rapidly grew, because of the 
state propaganda. See HANIOĞLU, pp. 126f.
11)  To this development nearer see C. J. LOWE, The Reluctant Imperialists. British Foreign Po-
licy 1878–1902, London 1967, p. 196f.
12)  HANIOĞLU, p. 132.
his fears of his personal security, which originated in his experiences from 
the years 1876–1878.2 Thanks to this the position of the secret policy gradu-
ally grew and the government introduced a strict censorship in 1888.3 The 
government of the Yıldız palace where the sultan placed his seat was there-
fore steadily oppressive. On the other hand although Abdülhamid was “bit-
terly hostile to liberal or constitutional ideas, [he] was by no means entirely 
opposed to reform and Westernization...”4 During his reign the Ottoman Em-
pire changed considerably. His rule can therefore be described as a sort of an 
enlightened absolutism.
The sultan with his most prominent associates alternating in the 
role of Grand Vezir were Küçük Sait Paşa (1838–1914) and Mehmet Kâmil 
Paşa (1832–1913),5 created a new style of government. This was ruled by “mo-
dern bureaucracy headed by a cadre of technocrats”, who were linked di-
rectly to the palace, which asserted a tight control of them and secured that 
the appointees to the high state offi  ces owed their loyalty only to the sultan.6 
Logically the center of this new bureaucratic machine rested in Yıldız, whe-
re the sultan could assert his control over it and vice versa because the fact 
that they had “daily access to the Sultan soon gave them more power than the 
ministers working in the Sublime Porte.”7 This form of centralizing govern-
ment was also introduced in the provinces, were subjected under such su-
pervision from the center which with the expansion of the telegraph net 
that wasn’t possible before.
This new form of administration had some positive impact on the 
state of the Ottoman Empire. The process of westernization and the reforms 
started in the Tanzimat continued under the new regime with an increased 
speed. Sait Paşa started an extensive program of educational reform and si-
2)  In 1876 his uncle and deposed sultan Abdülaziz was with the highest probability assassi-
nated and on 20. 5. 1878 a radical Ali Suavi with a mob of his supporters attempted to de-
pose the sultan – nearer see Joan HASLIP, Der Sultan, München 1958, pp. 145–147.
3)  Eduard GOMBÁR, Moderní dějiny Islámských zemí, Praha 1999, p. 275.
4)  Bernard LEWIS, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, third edition, Oxford 2002, p. 178.
5)  To their career and role in the establishment see Stanford J. SHAW, Ezel Kural SHAW, Histo-
ry of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 2, Cambridge, London, New York, Mel-
bourne 1977, pp. 219f.
6)  HANIOĞLU, p. 125.
7)  Philip MANSEL, Constantinople. City of the World’s Desire, 1453–1924, London, New York 
1995, p. 318.
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Macedonia and Albania, but also caused an escalation of the spread of Arab 
nationalism, which threatened the stability of the state in the areas which 
were loyal to Istanbul to this date. The steps on the international fi eld led in 
their consequences to the wars with Italy and the Balkan League, which re-
sulted in the loss of the last African and above all the European provinces 
(except a small strip of land between Istanbul and Edirne). The new situation 
in the center of the empire after the revolution in the summer 1908 and the 
steps of the Young Turks had more opposite eff ect than the revolutionaries 
intended. Instead of strengthening the state, they weakened it internally 
and externally which in its consequences led to a disaster.
As a result of the external catastrophes a new form of government 
arose there in 1913. After the CUP had come to power again after a short 
interlude in January 191317 and after the death of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, the 
Ottoman Empire was de facto ruled by a triumvirate consisting of Cemal 
Paşa, Taalat Paşa and Enver Paşa, who stood before a task how to rebuild and 
revitalize the empire.18 This was to be done by a series of reforms, most of 
that were never realized, because of the start of the First World War, but 
they helped the empire to endure the war burden for next four years in 
which it showed much more “vitality” than it seemed to have after the Bal-
kan wars when the Great Powers were preparing themselves for the eventu-
ality of abrupt fall of the empire. This war-capability was also caused by the 
higher internal stability under the triumvirate, whose regime however grew 
steadily oppressive.
One of the important lessons of the Balkan wars was the fact that 
unless the empire obtains some sort of protection from the Great Powers it 
wouldn’t be able to survive and it can be said, that “the Ottoman-German al-
liance of the following year must be seen in this context.”19 The creation of such 
a connection wasn’t however a defi nitive certainty in 1913. On the contrary, 
during the spring 1914 Istanbul tended to have good relations with the En-
tente powers,20 especially with Great Britain. At the end it was the case of the 
battleships built for the Ottomans which were confi scated by London in the 
17)  See GOMBÁR, pp. 305f.
18)  SHAW, p. 298.
19)  HANIOĞLU, p. 174. 
20)  Mustafa AKSAKAL, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914, Cambridge 2008, p. 90.
mic power projected itself on the Balkans and in the Near East. Although the 
cordial relations with Berlin brought some substantial results – as the mo-
dernization of the Ottoman army by the mission of colonel (and later fi eld 
marshal) Colmar von der Goltz or the building of the Baghdad railway,13 the 
Germans were never such a guarantee of the Ottoman independence as was 
Britain in the previous period. What was worse Abdülhamid wasn’t able to 
establish permanently good relations with the Balkan states and his eff orts 
to do so were more or less abandoned after the Young Turk revolution.
But despite of the above mentioned facts it must be concluded that 
although the Ottoman foreign policy suff ered from several setbacks during 
the Hamidian era, it was able to secure the Ottoman territorial integrity 
from the year 1882 till the collapse of the regime in 1908: “Abdülhamid II’s 
dexterous acrobatics in the fi eld of foreign policy helped the empire adjust to 
major changes in the balance of power and save off  a large-scale confl ict that 
might have gravely damaged its territorial integrity or even triggered its col-
lapse. Given the impossibility of obtaining a signifi cant European ally, this 
was a major achievement.”14
The constellation created by the Hamidian government changed 
signifi cantly after its fall during the Young Turk revolution. The idea of the 
opposition against the government of Abdülhamid II was a creation of con-
stitutional and liberal regime with liberal parliament and policy. However, 
this conception wasn’t fulfi lled. “Whatever liberal affi  nities the CUP leaders 
harbored prior to and immediately following the revolution quickly gave 
way to authoritarian tendencies.”15 The unity of the leaders of the former 
opposition and the revolution broke up soon after they had come to power. 
Two opposing cliques arose there – the liberals favoring decentralization 
and satisfying of the national aspiration of the border provinces and nati-
onalists who tended to support centralism and among whom the ideas of 
panturkism spread.16
This disunity led of course to internal disturbances and conside-
rable political instability, which further weakened the empire especially 
with regard to the growing foreign threats. The panturkic and islamistic 
elements in the government also did not lead only to growing instability in 
13)  Nearer see L. RATHMANN, Berlin-Baghdad, Berlin 1962.
14)  HANIOĞLU, p. 135.
15)  Ibid., p. 153.
16)  LEWIS, p. 213.
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the revenue reached 2,878.3 million.25 On the other hand the expenditures 
rose accordingly and the budget was always passive. In spite of this fact the 
government was able to reduce the percent of the budged which had to be 
used to pay the foreign debt. The structure of the budget also changed con-
siderably during the Hamidian era, whereas the main enhancement of fi -
nance was evident on the side of the army.26
The gradual improvement of the economic situation came also in 
the fi eld of the international trade of the empire. The average export amoun-
ted 18.6 million in the 70’s and rose to 27.3 million average in the years 
1910–1913.27 Accordingly the imports rose, whose dimension was a little bit 
higher, so the empire trade balance was passive in the investigated era. 
However the rise of the international trade meant that the empire enjoyed 
an economic prosperity. The importance of the trade for the empire can be 
seen by the fact that “in 1914, perhaps one-quarter of total agricultural pro-
duction was exported; exports altogether formed nearly 14 percent of the gro-
ss national product and the ‘ratio of imports to GNP was around 18 per cent.”28 
The trade main partners of the Ottoman Empire were Great Britain, France, 
Germany and Austria-Hungary. These four Great Powers “shipped three-quar-
ters of all imports and consumed 60–70 percent of Ottoman exports.”29
From these numbers, there could be made several conclusions. 
Above all it must be said the empire enjoyed during the last decades of 19th 
and the fi rst decade of 20th century a considerable economic growth and 
prosperity, which brought to the commercial centers an increase of level of 
living. These successes were however sorely paid. The dependence of the state 
on the foreign trade and investments gradually grew. In addition it was not 
the Ottomans who profi ted primarily from this development. The main pro-
fi ts were on the part of the Great Powers whose infl uence on the progress and 
control of Ottoman economy became even higher than in the previous peri-
od. The change of the regime in 1908 then led to the loss of a part of the fo-
reign investments and the defi cit of the public budget became to grow again. 
Due to the inadequate domestic investment possibilities the government 
25)  Ibid., p. 286.
26)  Ibid., p. 225.
27)  Halil İNALCIK, Donald QUATAERT (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman 
Empire, vol. 2, Cambridge 1994, p. 829.
28)  Ibid., p. 829ff .
29)  Ibid., p. 833, compare with SHAW, p. 237.
same day when they were intended to be handed over to the Turks21 which 
eventually led Istanbul to the camp of the Central Powers.
At the end of this section it could be said that it was the growing 
instability after the Young Turk coup that led to the crucial weakening of 
the empire and its subsequent defeats. On the contrary the relative stability 
of the Hamidian regime helped the empire to live through several interna-
tional crises without a loss of territory. On the other hand it was the chara-
cter of this same regime which was among the main reasons leading to the 
growing international isolation of Istanbul, which was one of the main re-
asons of later defeats and substantial losses in Europe and Africa in its 
consequences.
Economy
The most common assumption is that the Ottoman Empire became during 
the second half of the 19th century a semi-colony of the European powers, 
but under a thorough scrutiny it turns out, to be only a part of the truth. It 
is true that after the state bankruptcy in 1875 the external debt reached 220 
million pounds22 and this number went even higher during the war with 
Russia. With regard to this catastrophic situation, the Great Powers forced 
on the empire an international supervision of its debt at the Congress of 
Berlin. The Public Debt Administration then started work to resuscitate the 
Ottoman fi nances. It collected duties from the Ottoman trade and state mo-
nopolies such as on tobacco and salt. In this way it managed in collaboration 
with the government, which also tried to improve its situation to restore 
health to the Ottoman budget. Even the external debt fell from 239.5 million 
Ottoman pounds in 1881 to 125.3 million.23
This was of course a remarkable achievement, but the view of the 
Ottoman budget is not so impressing. The revenues of the government grew 
from 1,972.5 million kuruş in 1878 to 2,229.1 million in the fi scal year 
1905–1906.24 This trend improved during the Young Turk era, when in 1911 
21)  Nearer see MASSIE, Robert K., Castles of Steel, New York 2003, p. 22ff .
22)  GOMBÁR, p. 234.
23)  HANIOĞLU, p. 135.
24)  SHAW, p. 226.
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obedience, and sturdiness, especially in defensive operations...”,34 but the 
war exposed the weaknesses of the Ottoman military system, especially the 
inability of the conscription to work properly and to use all its potentially 
huge resources.35 Moreover the army lacked enough modern war materiel 
and the troops often lacked appropriate training. In addition the leadership 
was quite poor, although the army possessed some elite cadres of offi  cers, 
but these were only few. In combat the Turks were much better in defensive 
(especially around fortifi ed places as Plevno) than in off ensive. Although the 
army was capable to defeat the Russians several times, the overall result of 
the war was a disaster.
The government had to reform the army in order to make it more 
eff ective and capable to lead a modern armed confl ict. The real changes 
came after 1882, when the Germans established their military mission in 
Istanbul. A year later its chief became Colonel (later Field Marshal) Wilhelm 
Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, who was renowned for his book Das Volk in 
Waff en (The Nation in Arms).36 Under this talented man, who stayed in his 
post until 1896, the Turks started a modernization program. Von der Goltz 
dramatically changed the training system and carried through a reorgani-
zation of the Ottoman general staff . The Germans also helped the Turks to 
newly equip the army with modern weapons, although the limitations of 
the military budget. During this period the German army organization 
and structure became to serve “as the model for every aspect of the Ottoman 
military system.”37
The eff ectiveness of these reforms proved itself in the war with 
Greece in 1897, in which the Ottoman arms defeated the Greeks and opened 
the way to Athens.38 The confl ict was eventually solved by the mediation of 
the Great Powers, by whom the reputation of the Ottoman army was greatly 
34)  Mesut UYAR, Edward J. ERICKSON, A Military History of the Ottomans, Santa Barbara, 
Denver, Oxford 2009, p. 199.
35)  Theoretically the Ottoman conscription system could muster some 702,000 men in 1869, 
but the real fi gure was much lower – see Virginia H. AKSAN, Ottoman Wars 1700–1870, 
London, New York, San Francisco, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo 2007, p. 478. 
36)  Edward J. ERICKSON, Defeat in Detail. The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–13, West-
port, London 2003, p. 11.
37)  UYAR, ERICKSON, p. 207.
38)  The description of the war UYAR, ERICKSON, pp. 209f, compare with Alan PALMER, Úpa-
dek a pád Osmanské říše, Praha 1996, p. 195ff .
had to turn to the foreign loans again.30 This process only emphasized the 
dependence of Ottoman economy on the European powers especially with 
regard to the increased government spending during the armed confl icts 
with Italy and the Balkan league. The end of the economic connection with 
the allied powers during the First World War, whose investments the Ger-
mans weren’t able to replace eventually led to an economic catastrophe.31
In spite of these facts the Hamidian regime and even the Young 
Turks whom had to challenge increased internal instability and external 
threats achieved some very good results. The economic situation of the em-
pire improved which mirrored in the development of railways, roads, agri-
culture and even in the creation of a nucleus of industry, although major 
industrial companies employed only 35,000 workers.32 The Ottoman econo-
mical base rested in the agriculture which products were then exported to 
Europe. In this sense the Ottoman Empire remained in spite of all achieve-
ments relatively backward state compared with most of the European coun-
tries. This could be seen also from the comparison with other major Euro-
pean powers – the GDP of the empire before the First World War amounted 
only about 10 percent of that of Germany with about slightly above 20 per-
cent of its population.33 In this sense it must be admitted that the general 
assumption about the weakness of the Ottoman Empire from the point of 
economical view is justifi ed, in spite of the above mentioned improvements, 
which on the other hand were mainly achieved with the help of foreign in-
vestments.
Military
The views of the Ottoman armed forces diff er a lot. At the beginning of the 
Hamidian period the view of the European observers on its capabilities was 
determined by its mediocre performance during the war with Russia in 
1877–1878. “The Ottoman soldiers showed their traditional valor, courage, 
30)  AKSAKAL, p. 59ff .
31)  HANIOĞLU, p. 181.
32)  İNALCIK, QUATAERT, p. 898. To some remarks on the Ottoman industry see SHAW, p. 236.
33)  Stephen BROADBERRY, Mark HARRISON, The Economics of World War I, Cambridge 2005, 
see table on pages 9–10.
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uncle Abdülaziz. At the beginning of the second decade of the 20th century, 
the Ottomans possessed only a handful of more or less obsolete ships with 
only 5,351 offi  cers and 7,418 sailors.43 The possibility of eff ective fi ght aga-
inst Italy was therefore nil, which mirrored in the outcome of the war.
In the second of these confl icts – Balkan wars the army had to chal-
lenge several opponents under quite unfavorable conditions. The Macedoni-
an forces were soon cut off  from their supply bases by the Bulgarian attack 
and with regard to the inability of the navy to secure sea communications, 
these units were destined to be slowly annihilated by the enemy. Several de-
feats such as in battle of Kumanovo44 deeply demoralized the Ottoman army, 
which had to moreover face much stronger enemy (the Ottoman armed for-
ces surpassed the numerical strength of the single Balkan states, but were 
inferior to their united strength, especially when they had to challenge 
highly unfavorable strategic odds). Although the army recovered Adrianople 
in the Second Balkan War, its international reputation was totally ruined.
After the end of the confl ict, which expelled the Turks almost com-
pletely from Europe a diffi  cult task for the new triumvirate of Paşas now 
leading the empire remained. If they wanted strengthen the Ottoman state 
they had to modernize its army. In this process, they had to solve several 
problems. Firstly they had to replace the casualties sustained during the 
Balkan wars amounting to about 100,000 men.45 Secondly there was the 
question of armament and thirdly the problem of new army organization. 
For help with this huge task, the Ottoman government turned to its already 
traditional ally – Germany, which sent to Istanbul a mission of Major General 
Otto Liman von Sanders.46 Although the mission was eventually abandoned 
under a pressure of Entente powers, it brought some signifi cant results. The 
Ottoman army was rebuilt on the basis of the German model. On the eve of 
the First World War it consisted of four armies with 36 divisions47 and its 
43)  Ibid., p. 19.
44)  Richard C. HALL, The Balkan Wars 1912–1913, London, New York 2000, p. 49.
45)  Ibid., p. 135, compare with ERICKSON, Defeat in Detail, p. 329, where he claims that the 
total Ottoman loses were 50,000 killed, 100,000 wounded, 115,000 POW`s with another 
75,000 fatalities of diseases. 
46)  To its work on military mission see Edward J. ERICKSON, Ordered to Die. A History of the 
Ottoman Army in the First World War, Westport, London 2001, pp. 11f.
47)  Ibid., p. 5.
improved. This easy victory had however a negative impact on the armed 
forces. The sultan and the army command overlooked the shortcomings of 
the army and considered the reforms as complete.39 The increased prestige 
of the army also led the paranoiac monarch to doubts about the loyalty of the 
armed forces leading to some unpopular moves in the army command and 
to the suspension of bigger army maneuvers. These measures had however 
two negative impacts. Firstly, the preparedness and quality of the armed 
forces declined. Secondly it was inside the army, where the unpopularity of 
the Hamidian regime became quite strong. It showed itself especially in the 
units stationed in Macedonia, which was threatened by Bulgarian and Greek 
propaganda among local non-Muslim population. The development eventu-
ally led to the Young Turk revolution, conducted by the Macedonian army.
The new regime inherited the army structure and situation crea-
ted by the Hamidian government. In 1908, there were altogether 26,611 offi  -
cers, 286,112 men and 6,239 military students.40 In the reserve units (Redif 
divisions), which were called to services in case of war, there were another 
544,000 men.41 These are quite impressive numbers, if it is considered that 
other sources of manpower could be found in the gendarmarie and in the 
paramilitary units. But the army had a lot of shortcomings starting with the 
ineffi  cient organization and ending with the insuffi  cient equipment.
These weaknesses were partly improved in the following years be-
cause of the fact that the role of the war ministers was gradually strengthen, 
which was apparent during the function of Mumut Şevket Paşa in this offi  ce 
(from January 1910 until July 1912). During this period the Young Turks 
tried to improve the organization, structure and training of the army. But 
due to the fi nancial shortcomings and internal disputes they were not able 
to correct all insuffi  ciencies, especially in the fi eld of armament.42 These 
shortcomings became clear during the two main confl icts waged by the Ot-
tomans in this period. In the war with Italy in 1911–1912 the army wasn't 
able to intervene on the battlefi eld at all, because of the catastrophic state of 
the Ottoman navy, which was utterly neglected during the reign of Abdülha-
mid II, who remembered the role of the naval offi  cers in the deposition of his 
39)  UYAR, ERICKSON, p. 210.
40)  ERICKSON, Defeat in Detail, p. 15. 
41)  Ibid., p. 18.
42)  For example in 1912 the army possessed only 713,404 rifl es for 730,000 men (in case of 
mobilization) – see Ibid. p. 59 and the situation of Ottoman artillery was even worse.
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reform. But after a careful inquiry, it can be seen, that there were some posi-
tive aspects (the economic conjuncture, the abilities and achievements of the 
armed forces during the First World War, or the governmental reform pro-
gram during the Hamidian era), which didn’t correspond with the general 
picture of the “sick man on the Bosphorus”. It were these positive aspects in 
the Ottoman state and society which were among the factors, that caused, 
that the empire, which was according the contemporary observers doomed to 
collapse, outlived such the Great Powers as Hohenzollern Germany, Romanov 
Russia, or Austria-Hungary. In the retrospect it can be said that the Ottoman 
Empire wasn’t as weak as it is often assumed, but on the other hand its streng-
th shouldn’t be overestimated because of its internal problems and the deve-
lopment on the international fi eld, which often determined its future.
organization and equipment gradually improved, although the reformers 
had not time enough to complete their aims before the war.
Although this intensive reforms work, the reputation of the army 
abroad (especially in the west) remained poor. This was determined by the 
negative impression from its performance during the Balkan Wars and by 
the underestimating its real capabilities. The Turks were able to take lessons 
from their defeat and were able to implement them in the postwar reorgani-
zation.48 The performance of the Turks during the Great War was therefore 
a huge surprise for the allies. They were able to achieve some remarkable mi-
litary triumphs, such as at Gallipoli in 1915 and at Kut-al-Amara in 1916, al-
though the organizational and supply achievements of the Turks were remar-
kable. During the war the Ottomans mobilized 2,608,000 men, of which they 
lost 725,000.49 This considerable force was able to tie a substantial war resou-
rces of the enemy in the Near East and in this way to facilitate the war eff ort 
of the Central Powers in other regions: “Over the course of the war, Great Bri-
tain deployed 2,550,000 troops on the Ottoman fronts, constituting 32 per-
cent of the total number of British troops in the fi eld; at one point, the British 
had 880,300 men fi ghting the Ottomans, or 24 percent of British armed for-
ces. The Russians initially mobilized 160,000 troops on the Caucasian front. 
By September 1916, they had 702,000 troops facing the Ottomans in Anatolia 
and Iran, out of a total force of 3.7 million. Additionally, 50,000 French troops 
fought the Ottomans, mainly at the Dardanelles. The Italians dispatched an 
expeditionary force of 70,000 soldiers to quell a rebellion of the local militia 
in Tripoli and Cyrenaica aided by the Ottoman government. Total Allied ca-
sualties on the Ottoman fronts amounted to a massive 650,000.”50 It must be 
underlined that this remarkable achievement was reached only a short time 
after the catastrophic defeat during the Balkan wars, in which the standing 
Ottoman army was virtually annihilated. This is such a remarkable deed, 
that it could be stated, that the Ottoman army was the strongest of the three 
researched elements of the Ottoman state focused in this article.
After a careful scrutiny of the Ottoman policy, economy and milita-
ry a researcher founds a lot of weaknesses in these areas of a state power in 
the Ottoman Empire. The policy fought with instability, economy with the 
dominance of foreign powers and military with the lack of funds and will to 
48)  ERICKSON, Defeat in Detail, pp. 338f.
49)  HANIOĞLU, p. 181.
50)  Ibid., p. 180ff .
